Winston v. Lee

Respondent, Lee, was charged with attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. The Commonwealth of Virginia sought to compel Respondent to undergo a surgical procedure to remove a bullet lodged in his chest; petitioners alleged that the bullet would provide evidence of Respondent’s guilt or innocence. A number of evidentiary hearings were held on the motion. Following expert testimony at the second hearing, the state trial judge granted the motion to compel surgery.

Prior to scheduling the surgery, X rays of Respondent’s chest ordered by the surgeon revealed that the bullet was lodged substantially deeper than had been thought when the State court granted the motion to compel surgery. Due to medical reasons, the surgeon believed that a general anesthetic would be desirable.

After an evidentiary hearing, a rehearing based on the new evidence was denied by the lower courts. The District Court enjoined the threatened surgery. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The Court held that the compulsory surgical intrusion was in violation of the Respondent’s right to privacy and security of person under the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that the search was more intrusive than reasonably necessary to accomplish its goals.

The Court held that “a compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence [] implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be unreasonable even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.” The Court held that the proper function of the Fourth Amendment is to constrain against those intrusions “which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”[1]

In order to determine the reasonableness of the procedure, the Court weighed the Respondent’s interests in privacy and security against society’s interests in conducting the procedure.

1. Respondent’s interest in privacy and security

The Court noted that the threats to the health and safety of Respondent posed by the surgery were subject to “sharp dispute” between the parties, and that there was conflict in testimony concerning the nature and scope of the operation, including the length of the procedure.

The Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ finding that the kind of surgery to be performed on the Respondent involved essentially a “total divestment of Respondent’s ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin.” It added:

“When conducted with the consent of the patient, surgery requiring general anesthesia [was] not necessarily demeaning or intrusive. In such a case, the surgeon [was] carrying out the patient's own will concerning the patient's body and the patient's right to privacy [was] therefore preserved. In this case, however . . .  the Commonwealth propos[ed] to take control of Respondent's body, to drug this citizen—not yet convicted of a criminal offense—with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness, and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of a crime.”

2. Society’s interests in conducting the procedure

The Court held that petitioner’s contention that the bullet was needed in order to demonstrate that it was fired from the shop owner’s gun was not persuasive due to the availability of substantial circumstantial evidence indicating that Respondent was the individual who accosted the shop owner on the night of the robbery. The Court held that the availability of this evidence restricted the need for the Commonwealth to compel Respondent to undergo the procedure.

“A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence . . .implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.” 470 U.S., p. 759.

“The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the procedure. In a given case, the question whether the community's need for evidence outweighs the substantial privacy interests at stake is a delicate one admitting of few categorical answers.” 470 U.S., p. 760.

“When conducted with the consent of the patient, surgery requiring general anesthesia is not necessarily demeaning or intrusive. In such a case, the surgeon is carrying out the patient's own will concerning the patient's body and the patient's right to privacy is therefore preserved. In this case, however, . . . the Commonwealth proposes to take control of respondent's body, to ‘drug this citizen — not yet convicted of a criminal offense — with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness,’ . . . and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of a crime. This kind of surgery involves a virtually total divestment of respondent's ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin.” 470 U.S., p. 765.

“The operation sought will intrude substantially on respondent's protected interests. The medical risks of the operation, although apparently not extremely severe, are a subject of considerable dispute; the very uncertainty militates against finding the operation to be ‘reasonable.’ In addition, the intrusion on respondent's privacy interests entailed by the operation can only be characterized as severe. On the other hand, although the bullet may turn out to be useful to the Commonwealth in prosecuting respondent, the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate a compelling need for it. We believe that in these circumstances the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate that it would be ‘reasonable’ under the terms of the Fourth Amendment to search for evidence of this crime by means of the contemplated surgery.” 470 U.S., p. 766.