Region: Americas
Year: 1985
Court: Supreme Court
Health Topics: Disabilities, Hospitals, Mental health
Human Rights: Freedom from discrimination, Right to due process/fair trial, Right to liberty and security of person
Tags: Mental disability, Mental disorder, Mental illness, Mental institution, Mental retardation, Private hospitals
The Respondents, Cleburne Living Center (CLC) and others, brought suit against the City of Cleburne (the City) and a number of its officials, alleging that a zoning ordinance, and its application, violated the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential residents.
CLC intended to lease a building for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. They were informed by the City council that a special use permit, renewable annually, would be required as the zoning ordinance applicable to the site required such a permit for the construction of “[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions”; the City had determined that the proposed group home should be classified as a hospital for the “feeble-minded.” Accordingly, CLC applied for a special use permit, but the council denied the permit.
The District Court held the ordinance constitutional on its face and as applied. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that mental retardation was a “quasi-suspect” classification and that, under the applicable “heightened scrutiny” equal protection test, the ordinance was facially invalid because it did not substantially further an important governmental purpose.
The zoning ordinance violated the Respondents’ constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The Court held that the denial of the permit was based on “irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded” and was thus invalid under the Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. In its analysis, the Court first determined what standard of review to apply and how to treat the mentally retarded as a class under the Equal Protection clause.
The Court applied the “rational basis” standard of judicial review and it declined to grant the mentally retarded status as a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class. The Court noted that the mentally retarded were a "large and amorphous class" substantially protected by state and federal legislation addressing their distinct difficulties. The Court explained that any legislation that distinguished between the mentally retarded and others must therefore be “rationally related to a legitimate government interest” in order to withstand equal protection review. The Court added that the rational review standard “afford[ed] government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that [incidentally] burden the retarded.”
The Court held that the requirement that CLC obtain a special use permit was not “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose,” and thus was unconstitutional. The Court held that the permit requirement was based on “an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded,” including those who would occupy the proposed CLC group home. It held that “mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, [were] not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.”
The Court noted that these individuals would “live under the closely supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provided for by state and federal law,” and that the proposed group home posed no “special threat to the city's legitimate interests.” It stated that while the mentally retarded, as a group, were different from those who might occupy other facilities which did not require a permit, such as boarding houses and hospitals, the differences were irrelevant. The Court dismissed concerns that the facility would be opposite a school as well as doubts regarding legal liability for actions taken by the mentally retarded and concerns “with the size of the home and the number of people that would occupy it.”
“Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions, and because both State and Federal Governments have recently committed themselves to assisting the retarded, we will not presume that any given legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate.” 473 U.S., p. 446.
“To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” 473 U.S., p. 446.
“[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.” 473 U.S., p. 448.
“The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the [] facility and who would live under the closely supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provided for by state and federal law.” 473 U.S., p. 450.