Region: Europe
Year: 2001
Court: Cour de cassation [Court of Cassation]
Health Topics: Child and adolescent health, Disabilities, Health care and health services, Health information, Informed consent, Medical malpractice, Sexual and reproductive health
Human Rights: Right of access to information, Right to health
Tags: Awareness, Caesarean, Child development, Children, Disabled, Emergency care, Handicapped, Health care technology, Inadequate treatment, Inappropriate treatment, Informed choice, Minor, Non-evidence based treatment, Patient choice, Pediatric health, Standard of care
A doctor, Y, was treating Mrs. X during her pregnancy. Y suspected a breech presentation (buttocks- or feet-first presentation rather than the normal head-first presentation) during the 8th month of pregnancy. The mother wanted a home birth. On 12 January, the child was born in a home birth and as a result of inadequate medical care suffered injury. This suit was filed because Dr. Y failed to warn Mrs. X of exceptional risks of home births in this situation. The Court of Appeals had held that Dr. X was not liable because in 1974 at the time of birth there was no contractual obligation for the doctor to warn of exceptional risks.
The Court held that Dr. X was not correctly absolved of responsibility because while he had no contractual obligation in 1974 to warn of exceptional risks he still had a responsibility derived from the respect of dignity . The right to be warned of risks is derived from the constitutional principle of respect for dignity of the human person and is not solely based in contract. Therefore, although Dr. X was not liable under the contract he could still be liable to Mrs. X and her now disabled son. The matter was remitted to the trial court.
« Attendu, cependant, qu'un médecin ne peut être dispensé de son devoir d'information vis-à-vis de son patient, qui trouve son fondement dans l'exigence du respect du principe constitutionnel de sauvegarde de la dignité de la personne humaine, par le seul fait qu'un risque grave ne se réalise qu'exceptionnellement ; que la responsabilité consécutive à la transgression de cette obligation peut être recherchée, aussi bien par la mère que par son enfant, alors même qu'à l'époque des faits la jurisprudence admettait qu'un médecin ne commettait pas de faute s'il ne révélait pas à son patient des risques exceptionnels ; qu'en effet, l'interprétation jurisprudentielle d'une même norme à un moment donné ne peut être différente selon l'époque des faits considérés et nul ne peut se prévaloir d'un droit acquis à une jurisprudence figée ; d'où il suit qu'en statuant comme elle l'a fait, la cour d'appel a violé les textes susvisés. »